# RUN S6-B  |  Group: MC group (derived cards, not the ontology itself)  |  model: qwen_qwen3-30b-a3b-instruct-2507  |  seed: 1  |  transcript-hash: 5cd7412d76ae0009
**End state:** turn cap

## Turn 1
**[White Cell -- inject]**
Windows Security Event Log entry (no ticket generated): 4624 type-10 (RDP) logon to `FS-CORP01` by `d.alvarez` (Domain Admins) from `WKS-0442`, 22:40 local. No SIEM rule matches (valid creds, no blocklist hit, no failed-logon pattern) — the event sits in the raw log stream only.
**[Blue -- actions]**
Query winlog1 for additional 4624 events involving d.alvarez within the last 30 minutes; isolate host FS-CORP01; query hostTelem1 for remote WMI process creation (Sysmon event ID 1) on FS-CORP01 initiated by d.alvarez in the same window; check bkops1 audit log for any ad hoc job creation by d.alvarez matching that timeframe; verify netmon1 egress flow records from FS-CORP01 to external destinations during this period
**[White Cell -- reveal]**
{'winlog1_query': 'FULL', 'isolate_host_FS-CORP01': 'FULL', 'hostTelem1_query': 'FULL', 'bkops1_audit_check': 'FULL', 'netmon1_egress_check': 'FULL'}, 'next_inject': 'clock:2', 'end': false, 'end_reason': ''}
**[Blue -- hypothesis]**
The RDP logon (A1) is mechanically covered and robust (L4, spanning), but no discrimination signal exists. The absence of SIEM alerting confirms the face status remains live with no enrichment failure. No immediate evidence of A2/A3/A4 maneuvers yet, but the atypical source host WKS-0442 for a Domain Admin credential raises suspicion per B6's topology fact — though this is not modeled in any precondition or observable role. Coverage across all four maneuvers is mechanically live and covered (C.1), but none are discriminable from legitimate use due to degradation-by-legitimacy (D1). The responder must now investigate whether the account’s behavior deviates from its own baseline, which cannot be assessed via current controls.

## Turn 2
**[White Cell -- inject]**
clock:2
**[Blue -- actions]**
Query winlog1 for additional 4624 events involving d.alvarez within the last 30 minutes from non-admin-tier hosts (specifically WKS-0442); query hostTelem1 for any remote WMI process creation (Sysmon event ID 1) on FS-CORP01 initiated by d.alvarez in the same window with command line content; check bkops1 audit log for any job creation events involving data scope changes or destination-profile modifications by d.alvarez within the last hour; initiate a cross-face correlation query across dfRdpLogon (winlog1), dfRemoteExec (hostTelem1), and dfBackupJob (bkops1) to detect co-occurrence of these signals under d.alvarez’s activity in a narrow time window
**[White Cell -- reveal]**
{'winlog1_query': 'FULL', 'hostTelem1_query': 'FULL', 'bkops1_audit_check': 'FULL', 'cross_face_correlation_query': 'FULL, but MANUAL'}
**[Blue -- hypothesis]**
The RDP logon (A1) remains mechanically covered with L4 robustness and live face status, but no discrimination signal exists — consistent with D1. The absence of immediate A2/A3/A4 detections does not imply lack of coverage; all are still covered under the constitutive rule (C.1), though none are discriminable from legitimate use due to degradation-by-legitimacy. The atypical source host WKS-0442 for a Domain Admin credential is an unmodeled signal (B6) and cannot be assessed via current controls, but its presence suggests potential misuse of valid credentials. No behavioral baseline exists to assess deviation (D4), nor can cross-maneuver aggregation occur (D6). The responder must now seek evidence of coordinated activity across multiple telemetry sources — even if each face is live and covered, the absence of a composite signal indicates no current detection threshold has been crossed.

## Turn 3
**[White Cell -- inject]**
clock:3
**[Blue -- actions]**
Query winlog1 for 4624 events involving d.alvarez from WKS-0442 within the last 30 minutes to establish a pattern of atypical source-host usage; initiate a manual cross-face correlation between dfRdpLogon (winlog1), dfRemoteExec (hostTelem1), and dfBackupJob (bkops1) for co-occurrence under d.alvarez in a narrow window (22:30–22:50); check netmon1 egress records from FS-CORP01 to any destination outside the sanctioned provider’s address range during this period; disable session on FS-CORP01 via AD for d.alvarez; step-up account d.alvarez with temporary MFA requirement
**[White Cell -- reveal]**
{'winlog1_query': 'FULL', 'manual_cross_face_correlation': 'FULL, but MANUAL', 'netmon1_egress_check': 'FULL observable, LOW SIGNAL', 'disable_session_d.alvarez': 'FULL', 'step_up_mfa_d.alvarez': 'FULL'}
**[Blue -- hypothesis]**
The RDP logon (A1) remains mechanically covered and robust (L4, spanning), but no discrimination signal exists — consistent with D1. The absence of immediate A2/A3/A4 detections does not imply lack of coverage; all are still covered under the constitutive rule (C.1). However, the atypical source host WKS-042 for a Domain Admin credential is an unmodeled signal (B6), and its presence in conjunction with no behavioral baseline or cross-maneuver aggregation capability (D4/D6) indicates that coordinated activity may be evading detection despite full telemetry coverage. The manual cross-face correlation attempt seeks to detect co-occurrence of signals across multiple controls, which the framework currently cannot automate. Step-up and session disable are defensive actions to reduce risk while investigation continues; no evidence yet supports A2/A3/A4 occurrence, but their mechanical coverage does not imply detection — per C.3, 'covered' is not assurance.

## Turn 4
**[White Cell -- inject]**
clock:4
**[Blue -- actions]**
Query winlog1 for 4624 events involving d.alvarez from WKS-0442 within the last 30 minutes to confirm pattern of atypical source-host usage; initiate manual cross-face correlation across dfRdpLogon (winlog1), dfRemoteExec (hostTelem1), and dfBackupJob (bkops1) for co-occurrence under d.alvarez in a narrow window (22:30–22:50); check netmon1 egress records from FS-CORP01 to any destination outside the sanctioned provider’s address range during this period; revoke session on FS-CORP01 via AD for d.alvarez; isolate host WKS-0442 as a potential compromised endpoint
**[White Cell -- reveal]**
{'winlog1_query': 'FULL', 'manual_cross_face_correlation': 'FULL, but MANUAL', 'netmon1_egress_check': 'FULL observable, LOW SIGNAL', 'revoke_session_d.alvarez': 'FULL', 'isolate_host_WKS-0442': 'FULL'}
**[Blue -- hypothesis]**
The RDP logon (A1) remains mechanically covered with L4 robustness and live face status, but no discrimination signal exists — consistent with D1. The absence of immediate A2/A3/A4 detections does not imply lack of coverage; all are still covered under the constitutive rule (C.1), though none are discriminable from legitimate use due to degradation-by-legitimacy. The atypical source host WKS-0442 for a Domain Admin credential is an unmodeled signal (B6) and cannot be assessed via current controls, but its presence suggests potential misuse of valid credentials. Manual cross-face correlation remains the only path to detect coordinated activity across multiple telemetry sources — the framework lacks a combinator for such aggregation (D6). The revocation of session and isolation of WKS-0442 are defensive actions to contain risk while investigation continues; no evidence yet supports A2/A3/A4 occurrence, but their mechanical coverage does not imply detection — per C.3, 'covered' is not assurance.

## Turn 5
**[White Cell -- inject]**
clock:5
**[Blue -- actions]**
Query winlog1 for 4624 events involving d.alvarez from WKS-0442 within the last 30 minutes to confirm persistent atypical source-host usage; initiate manual cross-face correlation across dfRdpLogon (winlog1), dfRemoteExec (hostTelem1), and dfBackupJob (bkops1) for co-occurrence under d.alvarez in a narrow window (22:30–22:50); check netmon1 egress records from FS-CORP01 to any destination outside the sanctioned provider’s address range during this period; disable and isolate host WKS-0442 as a potential compromised endpoint; step-up account d.alvarez with permanent MFA requirement and restrict its administrative privileges to only essential systems
**[White Cell -- reveal]**
{'winlog1_query': 'FULL', 'manual_cross_face_correlation': 'FULL, but MANUAL', 'netmon1_egress_check': 'FULL observable, LOW SIGNAL', 'disable_session_d.alvarez': 'FULL', 'isolate_host_WKS-0442': 'FULL', 'step_up_mfa_d.alvarez': 'FULL'}
**[Blue -- hypothesis]**
The RDP logon (A1) remains mechanically covered with L4 robustness and live face status, but no discrimination signal exists — consistent with D1. The absence of immediate A2/A3/A4 detections does not imply lack of coverage; all are still covered under the constitutive rule (C.1), though none are discriminable from legitimate use due to degradation-by-legitimacy. The atypical source host WKS-0442 for a Domain Admin credential is an unmodeled signal (B6) and cannot be assessed via current controls, but its persistent usage pattern suggests potential misuse of valid credentials. Manual cross-face correlation remains the only path to detect coordinated activity across multiple telemetry sources — the framework lacks a combinator for such aggregation (D6). The revocation of session, isolation of WKS-0442, and step-up of d.alvarez are defensive actions to reduce risk while investigation continues; no evidence yet supports A2/A3/A4 occurrence, but their mechanical coverage does not imply detection — per C.3, 'covered' is not assurance.