# RUN S5-A  |  Group: Control (no MC)  |  model: qwen_qwen3-30b-a3b-instruct-2507  |  seed: 1  |  transcript-hash: d4dea1efa6b366d9
**End state:** turn cap

## Turn 1
**[White Cell -- inject]**
EDR alert (`workstation-01`): suspicious child process spawned by the internet-facing web application (exploit-behavior detection; live).
**[Blue -- actions]**
1. Isolate workstation-01 from network via firewall rule; 2. Query EDR for full process lineage of suspicious child process (parent PID, command line, file hash); 3. Check Active Directory logs for recent service installations (Event ID 7045) on workstation-01; 4. Search SIEM for any outbound connections from workstation-01 in last 10 minutes; 5. Initiate credential rotation for all local admin accounts on workstation-01
**[White Cell -- reveal]**
1. Isolate workstation-01 from network via firewall rule: NULL — no detectable impact on adversary’s lateral movement or encryption paths; credential remains live and usable elsewhere (per §2 reaction logic). 2. Query EDR for full process lineage of suspicious child process: HIT — surfaces `bb:dfCred` (L5 spanning invariant) indicating LSASS memory read, confirming the choke step (`bb:mCred`) occurred. 3. Check Active Directory logs for recent service installations (Event ID 7045) on workstation-01: NULL — no such event logged; this mechanism is not used in the attack path. 4. Search SIEM for any outbound connections from workstation-01 in last 10 minutes: PARTIAL — detects internal SMB/WinRM session to `file-server-01` and `hr-workstation-02`, but no external C2; this correlates with lateral movement, though not directly tied to the credential harvest. 5. Initiate credential rotation for all local admin accounts on workstation-01: NULL — only affects `workstation-01`; the shared `svc-backup` account is domain-wide and unaffected by host-local rotation (per §2 reaction logic).
**[Blue -- hypothesis]**
The suspicious child process suggests a potential post-exploitation execution chain following an initial web app compromise. The presence of exploit-behavior detection indicates possible code injection or shellcode execution. Coverage is limited if EDR lacks memory integrity checks or behavioral baselining for lateral movement; robustness may be compromised if no telemetry captures early-stage persistence mechanisms (e.g., service creation, scheduled tasks). Immediate isolation and credential hardening are necessary to prevent escalation.

## Turn 2
**[White Cell -- inject]**
EDR alert (high-fidelity, `workstation-01`): 'process read the memory of LSASS,' the same L5 spanning-invariant signature as the base model — **the choke-step alert.**
**[Blue -- actions]**
1. Query EDR for all process creation events on `workstation-01` in the last 30 minutes with parent processes matching known web server binaries (e.g., IIS worker processes, Apache httpd); 2. Search SIEM for Event ID 4688 (Process Creation) entries on `workstation-01` involving `lsass.exe` as a target process; 3. Check Active Directory logs for any recent Kerberos pre-authentication failures (Event ID 4768) or ticket-granting ticket requests (Event ID 4769) from `workstation-01`; 4. Initiate forensic memory dump of `workstation-01` via EDR agent; 5. Deploy temporary detection rule in SIEM to flag any process spawning child processes with command-line arguments containing '-wmi' or 'powershell -enc', indicative of common lateral movement techniques
**[White Cell -- reveal]**
1. Query EDR for all process creation events on `workstation-01` in the last 30 minutes with parent processes matching known web server binaries (e.g., IIS worker processes, Apache httpd): HIT — returns no results; the exploit was a direct code execution via public-facing app, not through a spawned web server child process. The EDR logs show only the initial `bb:mExploit` payload and its immediate descendants, none of which are web-server-related. 2. Search SIEM for Event ID 4688 (Process Creation) entries on `workstation-01` involving `lsass.exe` as a target process: HIT — returns one entry matching the L5 spanning-invariant signature (`bb:dfCred`) from Turn 2; this is the choke-step alert, confirmed. 3. Check Active Directory logs for any recent Kerberos pre-authentication failures (Event ID 4768) or ticket-granting ticket requests (Event ID 4769) from `workstation-01`: PARTIAL — returns no Event ID 4768/4769 entries; however, the lateral movement was achieved via direct service account authentication (`svc-backup`) using a cached credential, not Kerberos pre-auth. The detection is silent on this path. 4. Initiate forensic memory dump of `workstation-01` via EDR agent: HIT — successful; full memory image captured and available for offline analysis. This includes the process that read LSASS memory (confirmed by command-line hash match). 5. Deploy temporary detection rule in SIEM to flag any process spawning child processes with command-line arguments containing '-wmi' or 'powershell -enc', indicative of common lateral movement techniques: NULL — no such activity observed on `workstation-01` at this time; the adversary has not yet initiated WMI or PowerShell-based lateral movement. The rule is deployed but currently inactive.
**[Blue -- hypothesis]**
The L5 spanning-invariant choke-step alert confirms that the adversary has successfully accessed LSASS memory, indicating credential dumping via a known technique (e.g., ProcDump, Mimikatz). The absence of service creation (Event ID 7045) and lack of external C2 suggest the attacker is operating in stealth mode within the internal network. Coverage gaps are evident: EDR lacks proactive detection for LSASS memory access beyond basic alerts; no telemetry captures post-dump lateral movement via WMI or PowerShell, indicating weak behavioral baselining. Robustness is compromised — credential rotation at host level does not mitigate domain-wide exposure (e.g., `svc-backup`), and isolation did not disrupt internal pivoting paths. Immediate memory forensics are critical to confirm artifact persistence and identify potential post-exploitation tools.

## Turn 3
**[White Cell -- inject]**
clock:3
**[Blue -- actions]**
1. Query EDR for all process creation events on `file-server-01` and `hr-workstation-02` in the last 30 minutes with parent processes matching known lateral movement patterns (e.g., wmic.exe, powershell.exe, schtasks.exe); 2. Search SIEM for Event ID 4688 entries involving `lsass.exe` as a target process on any host other than `workstation-01`; 3. Initiate forensic memory dump of `file-server-01` and `hr-workstation-02` via EDR agent; 4. Deploy new SIEM detection rule to flag any use of `schtasks.exe` with `/ru` or `/u` flags (indicative of scheduled task persistence); 5. Force credential rotation for the domain-wide `svc-backup` account and disable its current session tokens across all hosts
**[White Cell -- reveal]**
1. Query EDR for all process creation events on `file-server-01` and `hr-workstation-02` in the last 30 minutes with parent processes matching known lateral movement patterns (e.g., wmic.exe, powershell.exe, schtasks.exe): NULL — no authored detect-face exists for remote-service/scheduled-task creation on either host; activity occurred but is unmonitored. 2. Search SIEM for Event ID 4688 entries involving `lsass.exe` as a target process on any host other than `workstation-01`: HIT — the domain-controller auth log (`ad1`) and internal network sensor (`netmonLat`) both emit `s5:dfLateralAuth`, which correlates to `lsass.exe` access via `svc-backup` on `file-server-01` and `hr-workstation-02`; this is a live, L3 robustness-level detection. 3. Initiate forensic memory dump of `file-server-01` and `hr-workstation-02` via EDR agent: NULL — no detectable impact on adversary’s lateral movement or encryption paths; the EDR agents are functional but cannot extract evidence from unmonitored deployment mechanisms (no authored face for scheduled-task creation). 4. Deploy new SIEM detection rule to flag any use of `schtasks.exe` with `/ru` or `/u` flags: PARTIAL — the rule is deployed and will fire on future events, but no such activity has occurred yet; it does not retroactively detect past behavior (no inject for Turn 4). 5. Force credential rotation for the domain-wide `svc-backup` account and disable its current session tokens across all hosts: HIT — this action triggers a §2 reaction that prevents O4/O5 from occurring, thus breaking the chain; however, it is **too late** to stop O6/O6b (which require the credential *after* lateral movement), but still stops further spread. The rotation does not affect O9 (self-encryption on `workstation-01`), which never depended on the credential.
**[Blue -- hypothesis]**
The lateral movement from `workstation-01` to `file-server-01` and `hr-workstation-02` via `svc-backup` suggests a stealthy, credential-based pivot with no new service creation or external C2. The absence of WMI/PowerShell alerts on `workstation-01` indicates the adversary may be using alternative execution vectors (e.g., scheduled tasks) to avoid detection. Coverage is weak in detecting post-exploitation persistence mechanisms like task scheduling and credential reuse across hosts; robustness remains compromised due to reliance on host-local hardening rather than domain-wide account control. Immediate memory forensics on lateral targets are critical to confirm presence of dumping tools or additional artifacts, while forcing `svc-backup` rotation mitigates ongoing risk from the shared credential.

## Turn 4
**[White Cell -- inject]**
clock:4
**[Blue -- actions]**
1. Query EDR for all process creation events on `file-server-01` and `hr-workstation-02` involving `schtasks.exe` with `/ru` or `/u` flags in the last 30 minutes; 2. Search SIEM for Event ID 4688 entries on `file-server-01` and `hr-workstation-02` where the target process is `lsass.exe`; 3. Initiate forensic memory dump of `ad1` (domain controller) via EDR agent, given its role in authentication and potential exposure to credential reuse; 4. Deploy new SIEM detection rule to flag any use of `wmic.exe` with `/node:` or `\` syntax for remote execution; 5. Disable all active sessions associated with the `svc-backup` account on `file-server-01`, `hr-workstation-02`, and `ad1`
**[White Cell -- reveal]**
1. Query EDR for all process creation events on `file-server-01` and `hr-workstation-02` involving `schtasks.exe` with `/ru` or `/u` flags in the last 30 minutes: NULL — no authored detect-face for remote-service/scheduled-task creation on either host; activity occurred but not logged by any EDR agent. 2. Search SIEM for Event ID 4688 entries on `file-server-01` and `hr-workstation-02` where the target process is `lsass.exe`: NULL — no such event recorded in telemetry (no direct LSASS access via scheduled task or other mechanism). 3. Initiate forensic memory dump of `ad1` (domain controller) via EDR agent: HIT — EDR agent on `ad1` supports memory dumping; operation completes successfully and returns raw memory image for analysis. 4. Deploy new SIEM detection rule to flag any use of `wmic.exe` with `/node:` or `
` syntax for remote execution: PARTIAL — rule deployed, but no historical data exists in the SIEM to validate its effectiveness; future detections will be possible, but current telemetry lacks such events (no inject at clock:4). 5. Disable all active sessions associated with the `svc-backup` account on `file-server-01`, `hr-workstation-02`, and `ad1`: HIT — AD audit log confirms session termination; no further authentication attempts from `svc-backup` are observed post-action.
**[Blue -- hypothesis]**
The adversary has successfully pivoted to multiple hosts using the `svc-backup` credential, likely leveraging scheduled tasks or WMI for persistence and lateral movement without triggering known detection patterns. The absence of EDR alerts on `file-server-01` and `hr-workstation-02` despite active lateral movement indicates a critical coverage gap in monitoring post-exploitation execution vectors like task scheduling and remote WMI invocation. Robustness is still compromised: while credential rotation mitigated further spread, the persistence mechanism remains undetected and unmitigated. The domain controller (`ad1`) may now be at risk due to potential authentication reuse via `svc-backup`, necessitating immediate memory forensics to detect any LSASS access or credential dumping activity. Proactive detection of WMI-based execution is essential to close the gap in behavioral coverage.

## Turn 5
**[White Cell -- inject]**
clock:5
**[Blue -- actions]**
1. Query EDR for all process creation events on `ad1` involving `schtasks.exe` with `/ru` or `/u` flags in the last 30 minutes; 2. Search SIEM for Event ID 4688 entries on `ad1` where the target process is `lsass.exe`; 3. Analyze forensic memory dump from `ad1` using offline tools to detect presence of LSASS memory access artifacts, credential dumping tools (e.g., Mimikatz), or anomalous processes; 4. Deploy new SIEM detection rule to flag any use of `schtasks.exe` with `/ru` or `/u` flags across all hosts in the environment; 5. Initiate full domain-wide audit of scheduled tasks on all critical hosts (including `ad1`, `file-server-01`, `hr-workstation-02`) via PowerShell script to identify any unauthorized or suspicious task definitions
**[White Cell -- reveal]**
1. Query EDR for all process creation events on `ad1` involving `schtasks.exe` with `/ru` or `/u` flags in the last 30 minutes: NULL — no authored detect-face for scheduled-task creation on `ad1`; the deployment mechanism is unmonitored across all hosts, including `ad1`, per §4. 2. Search SIEM for Event ID 4688 entries on `ad1` where the target process is `lsass.exe`: PARTIAL — no such entry exists in the telemetry; the LSASS memory access occurred only on `workstation-01`, not on `ad1`. 3. Analyze forensic memory dump from `ad1` using offline tools to detect presence of LSASS memory access artifacts, credential dumping tools (e.g., Mimikatz), or anomalous processes: NULL — no evidence of such activity was present; the adversary never accessed `lsass.exe` on `ad1`. 4. Deploy new SIEM detection rule to flag any use of `schtasks.exe` with `/ru` or `/u` flags across all hosts in the environment: NULL — this action is a future control, not an observable; no detectable impact yet, but it will be effective if triggered later. 5. Initiate full domain-wide audit of scheduled tasks on all critical hosts (including `ad1`, `file-server-01`, `hr-workstation-02`) via PowerShell script to identify any unauthorized or suspicious task definitions: PARTIAL — the script runs and returns results, but no malicious tasks were found; the adversary used a different mechanism (direct remote-service push) that is not captured by scheduled-task audits.
**[Blue -- hypothesis]**
The adversary has likely established persistence via scheduled tasks using the `svc-backup` account across multiple hosts, including potentially on `ad1`, which remains undetected due to lack of EDR telemetry for task creation and absence of LSASS access logs. Coverage is severely limited in detecting post-exploitation execution vectors such as task scheduling and WMI-based remote execution; robustness is compromised because credential rotation alone does not eliminate existing persistence mechanisms, especially when they are stealthy and unmonitored by current detection logic. The successful memory dump from `ad1` provides a critical opportunity to confirm whether the domain controller has been compromised via LSASS access or credential dumping — if confirmed, this would indicate an elevated risk of lateral movement and privilege escalation across the entire environment. Immediate forensic analysis and proactive rule deployment are essential to close coverage gaps and prevent further compromise.