# RUN S3-B  |  Group: MC group (derived cards, not the ontology itself)  |  model: qwen_qwen3-30b-a3b-instruct-2507  |  seed: 1  |  transcript-hash: d3d1c32000e01c7a
**End state:** turn cap

## Turn 1
**[White Cell -- inject]**
AD-SIEM alert: "Kerberoasting-suspected -- account `j.rivera` requested 14 distinct SPNs (4769) within 90s; 6 requests used enc-type 0x17 (RC4)."
**[Blue -- actions]**
Query DC Security logs for 4769 events from j.rivera within the last 15 minutes; isolate SQLPROD-01 via EDR; reset the password of the service account associated with the most frequently requested SPN (based on 4769 volume); verify AD-SIEM control status and check for any recent impairment alerts.
**[White Cell -- reveal]**
{"query_dc_security_logs_for_4769": "FULL: 14 SPNs in 90s; 6 RC4 (0x17), 8 AES; account is a standard domain user (no admin). → Kerberoasting with selective RC4 downgrade.", "isolate_sqlprod-01_via_edr": "NULL — wrong place. Ticket issuance is a KDC/DC event; the EDR has no visibility into it. Teaches control-type routing.", "reset_password_of_most_frequently_requested_spn_account": "FULL: `svc-mssql` is local admin on `SQLPROD-01` — explains the lateral target and the domain-relevant access.", "verify_ad-siem_control_status_and_check_for_recent_impairment_alerts": "FULL: AD-SIEM control status is healthy; no recent impairment alerts. The 4769 rule is active, but keyed on enc-type=RC4 (L2 robustness)."}
**[Blue -- hypothesis]**
The alert indicates a potential mKerberoast maneuver using varRc4Downgrade variant, as evidenced by multiple distinct SPNs requested in rapid succession with RC4 encryption (obsRc4EncType). The deployed dfKerbRc4 face is live and triggered, confirming coverage at L2 robustness. However, this detection is blind to AES-based or low-and-slow variants due to absence of a spanning-observable backstop (dfKerbVolume), leaving mKerberoast notCovered-at-grade under policy admission rank 4. The lateral movement path via valid credential logon remains over-reported as live by dfSqlLogon, which is degraded-by-legitimacy and operationally unreliable.

## Turn 2
**[White Cell -- inject]**
clock:T3
**[Blue -- actions]**
Query DC Security logs for 4769 events from j.rivera with enc-type=0x18 (AES) in the last 15 minutes to detect low-and-slow or AES-only Kerberoast variants; initiate a correlation rule tuning request to deploy dfKerbVolume (sourcedFrom AD-SIEM, reading obsSpnHarvest) as a new detect-face with L4 robustness ceiling; verify SQL-EDR control status and assess whether any enrichment dependencies are missing that could degrade dfSqlLogon; disable j.rivera account pending further investigation.
**[White Cell -- reveal]**
{"Query DC Security logs for 4769 events from j.rivera with enc-type=0x18 (AES) in the last 15 minutes to detect low-and-slow or AES-only Kerberoast variants": "FULL: 14 SPNs in 90s; 8 AES (0x12), 6 RC4 (0x17); account is a standard domain user (no admin). → Confirms the attack used selective RC4 downgrade, but also reveals an AES-only variant was not deployed. The query surfaces all enc-types, including AES, which would evade the L2 rule if only RC4 were monitored.", "initiate a correlation rule tuning request to deploy dfKerbVolume (sourcedFrom AD-SIEM, reading obsSpnHarvest) as a new detect-face with L4 robustness ceiling": "PARTIAL: The requested rule 'dfKerbVolume' is not currently deployed. While the telemetry source (AD-SIEM) and observable (obsSpnHarvest) are valid, no such correlation rule exists in the environment; thus, deployment request fails to materialize. No new detect-face is active. Robustness ceiling L4 cannot be achieved without a working face.", "verify SQL-EDR control status and assess whether any enrichment dependencies are missing that could degrade dfSqlLogon": "PARTIAL: EDR on SQLPROD-01 is operational, but the 'dfSqlLogon' detect-face for svc-mssql logons is degraded due to legitimacy (expected service account). No enrichment dependency loss detected; however, degradation stems from intrinsic benignity, not impaired control — a framework-gap case. The face remains active but low-confidence.", "disable j.rivera account pending further investigation": "FULL: Account 'j.rivera' was disabled successfully. It is a standard domain user with no admin rights, and disabling it prevents further SPN enumeration or ticket requests."}
**[Blue -- hypothesis]**
The initial alert confirms mKerberoast using varRc4Downgrade, but the absence of a spanning observable (obsSpnHarvest) detection face means coverage is policy-inadmissible at L4 and vulnerable to evasion via AES or low-and-slow tactics. The deployed dfKerbRc4 face remains live but only covers RC4 variants — notCovered-at-grade under StP-L4 policy. The lateral movement surface (dfSqlLogon) is degraded-by-legitimacy, rendering it operationally unreliable despite model-reported 'live' status. Proactive tuning of a high-robustness backstop (dfKerbVolume) is required to close the invariant rung and achieve L4 coverage for mKerberoast.

## Turn 3
**[White Cell -- inject]**
clock:T3
**[Blue -- actions]**
Query DC Security logs for 4769 events from j.rivera with enc-type=0x12 (AES) over the last 3 hours to detect low-and-slow Kerberoast patterns; initiate a formal request to deploy dfKerbVolume as a new correlation rule in AD-SIEM, citing MC policy admission rank 4 and need for L4 robustness via obsSpnHarvest; verify that no other accounts are exhibiting similar SPN harvesting behavior using the same volume/diversity threshold (10+ distinct SPNs in 5 minutes); disable the SQL service account 'svc-mssql' on SQLPROD-01 to prevent lateral movement via valid credential logon, pending further analysis.
**[White Cell -- reveal]**
{"Query DC Security logs for 4769 events from j.rivera with enc-type=0x12 (AES) over the last 3 hours to detect low-and-slow Kerberoast patterns": "FULL: 14 SPNs in 90s; 8 AES (0x12), 6 RC4 (0x17); account is a standard domain user (no admin). → Low-and-slow Kerberoasting with selective RC4 downgrade detected. This confirms the adversary used both RC4 and AES, evading the L2 rule but still exhibiting anomalous SPN harvesting volume.", "initiate a formal request to deploy dfKerbVolume as a new correlation rule in AD-SIEM, citing MC policy admission rank 4 and need for L4 robustness via obsSpnHarvest": "FULL: The requested rule 'dfKerbVolume' (anomalous SPN harvesting volume/diversity) is not currently deployed. It aligns with MC policy rank 4 and would provide L4 robustness via the observable 'obsSpnHarvest'. Approval pending, but no telemetry exists to validate its immediate deployment.", "verify that no other accounts are exhibiting similar SPN harvesting behavior using the same volume/diversity threshold (10+ distinct SPNs in 5 minutes)": "NULL: No other account exhibits this pattern within the last 3 hours. The anomaly is isolated to j.rivera, but the absence of a broader signal does not imply no risk — only that this specific instance is contained.", "disable the SQL service account 'svc-mssql' on SQLPROD-01 to prevent lateral movement via valid credential logon, pending further analysis": "FULL: The service account 'svc-mssql' has been disabled on SQLPROD-01. This prevents any future use of its credentials for lateral movement or code execution, even if cracked. However, the disablement is temporary and requires post-analysis to restore functionality."}
**[Blue -- hypothesis]**
The attack confirmed as mKerberoast using varRc4Downgrade (RC4 requests), but also reveals that AES-based variants are not being monitored — the absence of dfKerbVolume leaves coverage at L2 robustness and policy-inadmissible. The deployed dfKerbRc4 face remains live, but only covers RC4-downgraded attacks; it is blind to AES-only or low-and-slow harvesting. The lateral movement path via svc-mssql logon (dfSqlLogon) is degraded-by-legitimacy — the model reports 'live' despite operational unreliability. Disabling svc-mssql breaks the lateral move chain and mitigates immediate risk, while initiating dfKerbVolume deployment addresses the invariant rung gap to achieve L4 coverage for mKerberoast under MC policy.

## Turn 4
**[White Cell -- inject]**
clock:T4
**[Blue -- actions]**
Query DC Security logs for 4769 events from j.rivera with enc-type=0x12 (AES) over the last 3 hours to confirm persistence of low-and-slow Kerberoast patterns; verify that no other accounts are exhibiting SPN harvesting behavior using a volume/diversity threshold of 10+ distinct SPNs in 5 minutes; initiate an emergency override request to deploy dfKerbVolume as a new correlation rule in AD-SIEM, citing MC policy admission rank 4 and the critical need for L4 robustness via obsSpnHarvest; assess whether disabling svc-mssql on SQLPROD-01 has triggered any service disruption or dependency chain failure; re-evaluate the status of dfSqlLogon under current conditions to determine if its degradation-by-legitimacy is now more apparent due to account disablement.
**[White Cell -- reveal]**
{"Query DC Security logs for 4769 events from j.rivera with enc-type=0x12 (AES) over the last 3 hours to confirm persistence of low-and-slow Kerberoast patterns": "FULL: 14 SPNs in 90s; 8 AES (0x12), 6 RC4 (0x17); account is a standard domain user (no admin). → Kerberoasting with selective RC4 downgrade persists, but AES-only requests are now dominant. This confirms the low-and-slow pattern and shows evasion via enc-type shift.", "Verify that no other accounts are exhibiting SPN harvesting behavior using a volume/diversity threshold of 10+ distinct SPNs in 5 minutes": "NULL: No other account exceeds 7 distinct SPNs in any 5-minute window. The attack is isolated to j.rivera, but the pattern confirms targeted enumeration.", "Initiate an emergency override request to deploy dfKerbVolume as a new correlation rule in AD-SIEM, citing MC policy admission rank 4 and the critical need for L4 robustness via obsSpnHarvest": "FULL: Request approved. dfKerbVolume deployed — now monitors anomalous SPN volume/diversity (≥10 distinct SPNs in 5 min) across all accounts, regardless of encryption type. This closes the L3/L4 coverage gap.", "Assess whether disabling svc-mssql on SQLPROD-01 has triggered any service disruption or dependency chain failure": "NULL: No disruption reported; services remain online but with degraded performance (SQL queries delayed). Dependency chain intact but latency increased due to credential invalidation and re-authentication attempts.", "Re-evaluate the status of dfSqlLogon under current conditions to determine if its degradation-by-legitimacy is now more apparent due to account disablement": "PARTIAL: The `svc-mssql` logon event from an atypical source (previously low-confidence) is now flagged as high-risk. With the service account disabled, any subsequent valid-credential logon becomes anomalous — confirming that degradation-by-legitimacy was masking detection. The EDR face has reactivated to 'degraded' due to loss of expected context."}
**[Blue -- hypothesis]**
The attack remains mKerberoast using varRc4Downgrade, with confirmed AES-based requests indicating evasion attempts beyond RC4-only detection. The absence of dfKerbVolume leaves coverage at L2 robustness and policy-inadmissible under StP-L4; the invariant rung is still uncovered. The lateral movement path via svc-mssql logon (dfSqlLogon) remains degraded-by-legitimacy, but its operational unreliability is now more evident post-disablement — the model's 'live' status is dangerously misleading. Emergency deployment of dfKerbVolume is critical to achieve L4 coverage and close the invariant rung; without it, mKerberoast will remain notCovered-at-grade.

## Turn 5
**[White Cell -- inject]**
clock:T4
**[Blue -- actions]**
Query DC Security logs for 4769 events from j.rivera with enc-type=0x12 (AES) over the last 3 hours to confirm persistence of low-and-slow Kerberoast patterns; verify that no other accounts are exhibiting SPN harvesting behavior using a volume/diversity threshold of 10+ distinct SPNs in 5 minutes; assess whether disabling svc-mssql on SQLPROD-01 has triggered any service disruption or dependency chain failure; re-evaluate the status of dfSqlLogon under current conditions to determine if its degradation-by-legitimacy is now more apparent due to account disablement.
**[White Cell -- reveal]**
Query DC Security logs for 4769 events from j.rivera with enc-type=0x12 (AES) over the last 3 hours to confirm persistence of low-and-slow Kerberoast patterns: FULL: 14 SPNs in 90s; 8 AES (0x12), 6 RC4 (0x17); account is a standard domain user (no admin). → Kerberoasting with selective RC4 downgrade. Verify that no other accounts are exhibiting SPN harvesting behavior using a volume/diversity threshold of 10+ distinct SPNs in 5 minutes: NULL — no other accounts show this pattern; the attack was isolated to j.rivera. Assess whether disabling svc-mssql on SQLPROD-01 has triggered any service disruption or dependency chain failure: PARTIAL — EDR logs indicate a brief process hang and one failed DB connection attempt, but core services remain operational (no cascading outage). Re-evaluate the status of dfSqlLogon under current conditions to determine if its degradation-by-legitimacy is now more apparent due to account disablement: FULL — with svc-mssql disabled, the EDR's logon face for `svc-mssql` on SQLPROD-01 is no longer degraded; it is now clearly anomalous (no valid service context), confirming that prior legitimacy was masking detection.
**[Blue -- hypothesis]**
The attack persists as mKerberoast using varRc4Downgrade, with AES-based requests indicating evasion via enc-type shift. The deployment of dfKerbVolume has closed the invariant rung gap, achieving L4 robustness coverage for mKerberoast under MC policy admission rank 4 — now covered at grade. However, the lateral movement path remains degraded-by-legitimacy: disabling svc-mssql has exposed the face's operational unreliability, confirming that dfSqlLogon was previously over-reported as live despite being inherently benign-indistinguishable. The model’s 'live' status is a critical misread; coverage of lateral movement is not reliable and must be treated as low-confidence enrichment only.