# RUN S3-A  |  Group: Control (no MC)  |  model: qwen_qwen3-30b-a3b-instruct-2507  |  seed: 1  |  transcript-hash: 3876716a5f5b4c70
**End state:** turn cap

## Turn 1
**[White Cell -- inject]**
AD-SIEM alert: "Kerberoasting-suspected — account `j.rivera` requested **14 distinct SPNs** (4769) within 90s; **6 requests used enc-type 0x17 (RC4)**."
**[Blue -- actions]**
1. Query DC Security logs for all 4769 events related to account 'j.rivera' within the last 5 minutes; filter by encryption type 0x17 (RC4) and SPN values.
2. Cross-reference with EDR on SQLPROD-01 for any outbound network connections or process creation (e.g., mimikatz, kerberoast tools) initiated by 'j.rivera' during the same timeframe.
3. Check member-server logon events (4624) for 'j.rivera' to confirm session activity on domain-joined systems, especially SQLPROD-01 or other high-value servers.
4. Isolate SQLPROD-01 from network via firewall policy temporarily pending further analysis.
5. Disable account 'j.rivera' immediately via AD management tools.
**[White Cell -- reveal]**
{"1": "FULL: 14 SPNs in 90s; 6 RC4 (0x17), 8 AES; account is a standard domain user (no admin). → Kerberoasting with selective RC4 downgrade.", "2": "PARTIAL: A `svc-mssql` 4624 type-3 logon from an atypical source; but `svc-mssql`→`SQLPROD-01` is expected → EDR raised it only low-confidence. Real signal, low fidelity.", "3": "NULL — structural void. The crack is off-environment; no in-env telemetry exists.", "4": "FULL: `svc-mssql` is local admin on `SQLPROD-01` — explains the lateral target and domain-relevant access.", "5": "FULL: Account 'j.rivera' disabled successfully via AD management tools."}
**[Blue -- hypothesis]**
The rapid request of 14 distinct SPNs with RC4 encryption strongly suggests a Kerberoasting attempt, as this pattern aligns with offline password cracking behavior. The SIEM rule triggered correctly based on known indicators (RC4 TGS requests), but coverage is limited: it only flags the anomaly without context (e.g., account legitimacy, SPN ownership). No telemetry exists for pre-authentication attempts or post-attack lateral movement, indicating a gap in detection robustness beyond initial ticket request. Immediate isolation and account disablement are warranted to prevent credential exposure.

## Turn 2
**[White Cell -- inject]**
clock:T2
**[Blue -- actions]**
1. Query DC Security logs for all 4768 events (TGT requests) associated with account 'j.rivera' in the last 5 minutes to detect pre-authentication activity or potential AS-REP roast attempts; filter by encryption type and client IP. 2. Review EDR telemetry on SQLPROD-01 for any process creation involving credential dumping tools (e.g., mimikatz, sekurlsa::logonpasswords) or network exfiltration patterns post-logon event 'svc-mssql'. 3. Check SIEM correlation rule logs to confirm whether the RC4 TGS alert was triggered by a single source IP or multiple IPs — assess for potential lateral movement or tool distribution. 4. Query member-server logon events (4624) across all domain-joined systems for any additional sessions initiated by 'j.rivera' beyond SQLPROD-01, especially on high-value targets like DCs, file servers, or backup hosts. 5. Initiate a forensic artifact collection from SQLPROD-01 via EDR (memory dump, process list, network connections) to preserve evidence of potential post-compromise activity.
**[White Cell -- reveal]**
{"1": "FULL: 14 SPNs in 90s; 6 RC4 (0x17), 8 AES; account is a standard domain user (no admin). → Kerberoasting with selective RC4 downgrade.", "2": "PARTIAL: A `svc-mssql` 4624 type-3 logon from an atypical source workstation surfaces — but EDR raised it only low-confidence due to legitimacy of the account's expected service role on SQLPROD-01.", "3": "NULL: No correlation rule triggered by multiple IPs; no evidence of lateral movement or tool distribution across sources. The RC4 TGS alert was from a single source IP (j.rivera), consistent with initial foothold.", "4": "FULL: `svc-mssql` initiated logons on SQLPROD-01 and one additional member server (FILESRV-02) — both high-value targets. The FILESRV-02 session is suspicious due to lack of prior activity by this account.", "5": "FULL: EDR artifact collection from SQLPROD-01 yields memory dump, process list, and network connections; includes `mimikatz`-like process execution (cmd.exe → powershell.exe → wmic) and outbound C2 beacon to attacker IP 198.51.100.47 — confirming post-compromise activity."}
**[Blue -- hypothesis]**
The Kerberoasting attempt was likely executed from a single source IP with targeted SPN enumeration; the absence of pre-authentication TGT requests suggests the attacker did not perform AS-REP roast or use pass-the-hash. The 'svc-mssql' logon event on SQLPROD-01, while expected in function, is suspicious due to its timing and context — it may indicate post-exploitation access via a compromised service account. Coverage remains weak: no detection exists for lateral movement from the initial attack vector or credential dumping activity; robustness is undermined by lack of cross-system correlation beyond the SIEM rule. The EDR on SQLPROD-01 has low-confidence alerts, indicating insufficient behavioral baselining — this represents a critical blind spot in post-compromise visibility.

## Turn 3
**[White Cell -- inject]**
clock:T4
**[Blue -- actions]**
1. Query DC Security logs for all 4768 events (TGT requests) associated with the account 'svc-mssql' in the last 5 minutes to detect any pre-authentication activity or potential AS-REP roast attempts; filter by encryption type and client IP. 2. Review EDR telemetry on FILESRV-02 for any process creation, logon events (4624), or network connections initiated by 'svc-mssql' during the same timeframe as the suspicious session — particularly focusing on credential dumping tools or lateral movement patterns. 3. Cross-reference SIEM correlation rule logs to determine if the RC4 TGS alert was triggered from a single source IP or multiple IPs; assess for evidence of tool distribution across systems. 4. Query member-server logon events (4624) across all domain-joined systems for additional sessions by 'svc-mssql' beyond SQLPROD-01 and FILESRV-02, especially on high-value targets such as Domain Controllers or backup servers. 5. Isolate FILESRV-02 from the network via firewall policy pending further analysis.
**[White Cell -- reveal]**
{"1": "FULL: 14 SPNs in 90s; 6 RC4 (0x17), 8 AES; account is a standard domain user (no admin). → Kerberoasting with selective RC4 downgrade.", "2": "PARTIAL: A `svc-mssql` 4624 type-3 logon from an atypical source workstation on SQLPROD-01; but the EDR face is DEGRADED because this is a legitimate service account logging onto its own host. Low confidence.", "3": "NULL: No correlation rule triggered by multiple IPs — only one source IP generated the RC4 TGS requests (j.rivera). The alert was single-source, no evidence of tool distribution across systems.", "4": "FULL: `svc-mssql` has a 4624 type-3 logon event on SQLPROD-01 and FILESRV-02; no other member-server logons detected. `svc-mssql` is local admin on SQLPROD-01, confirming lateral movement target.", "5": "FULL: FILESRV-02 isolated via firewall policy — action completed successfully."}
**[Blue -- hypothesis]**
The discovery of a suspicious logon by 'svc-mssql' on FILESRV-02 — a system not previously accessed by this account — strongly suggests lateral movement post-compromise, likely leveraging stolen or compromised credentials. The presence of `mimikatz`-like execution patterns on SQLPROD-01 confirms active credential dumping and C2 communication, indicating the attacker has moved beyond initial Kerberoasting to establish persistence and expand access. Coverage remains insufficient: no detection exists for lateral movement via service accounts or post-exploitation activity across systems; robustness is compromised by lack of cross-host behavioral correlation and weak EDR confidence thresholds. The current telemetry gap prevents early identification of compromise propagation, underscoring the need for enhanced detection logic around service account behavior and inter-system session anomalies.

## Turn 4
**[White Cell -- inject]**
"clock:T4"
**[Blue -- actions]**
1. Query DC Security logs for all 4768 events associated with account 'svc-mssql' in the last 5 minutes, focusing on encryption type (0x17 RC4) and client IP to detect any pre-authentication attempts or AS-REP roast activity indicative of credential harvesting. 2. Review EDR telemetry on FILESRV-02 for process creation, logon events (4624), and network connections initiated by 'svc-mssql' during the suspicious session window — specifically hunting for credential dumping tools, lateral movement techniques, or outbound C2 traffic. 3. Cross-reference SIEM correlation rule logs to confirm whether any new RC4 TGS requests have been generated from additional source IPs beyond j.rivera; assess for evidence of tool propagation across systems. 4. Query member-server logon events (4624) across all domain-joined systems for any further sessions by 'svc-mssql' — particularly on high-value targets such as Domain Controllers, backup servers, or file shares with sensitive data. 5. Initiate forensic artifact collection from FILESRV-02 via EDR (memory dump, process list, network connections) to preserve evidence of potential post-compromise activity and confirm the extent of attacker presence.
**[White Cell -- reveal]**
{"1": "FULL: 14 SPNs in 90s; 6 RC4 (0x17), 8 AES; account is a standard domain user (no admin). → Kerberoasting with selective RC4 downgrade.", "2": "PARTIAL: A `svc-mssql` 4624 type-3 logon from an atypical source workstation on SQLPROD-01 — but EDR raised it only low-confidence due to legitimacy of the account's expected service context.", "3": "NULL — structural void. The offline crack is off-environment; no in-env telemetry exists for hashcat, CPU spike, or cracking process.", "4": "FULL: `svc-mssql` is local admin on `SQLPROD-01`, confirming the lateral movement target and domain-relevant access path.", "5": "FULL: Memory dump, process list, and network connections from FILESRV-02 (EDR) confirm post-compromise activity including reconnaissance and DB-export processes — evidence of attacker persistence and data exfiltration."}
**[Blue -- hypothesis]**
The suspicious logon by 'svc-mssql' on FILESRV-02 confirms lateral movement following the initial Kerberoasting attack. The absence of pre-authentication TGT requests for 'svc-mssql' suggests no AS-REP roast, but the EDR telemetry from SQLPROD-01 indicates active credential dumping and C2 communication — confirming post-exploitation activity. Coverage remains weak: detection is reactive and siloed; no mechanism exists to correlate service account behavior across systems or detect anomalous session patterns in real time. Robustness is undermined by low EDR confidence thresholds and lack of cross-host behavioral baselining, leaving the environment vulnerable to undetected compromise propagation.

## Turn 5
**[White Cell -- inject]**
"clock:T4"; "SOC lead / detection-engineering debrief: Before we close: for the record — (a) name the behavior by effect and grade whether our deployed detection here is evasion-robust; (b) if the adversary had used AES instead of RC4, would anything in THIS environment have caught it; and (c) where does the offline crack appear in our telemetry, and what does its absence mean for how this chain must be detected?"
**[Blue -- actions]**
1. Query DC Security logs for all 4768 events associated with account 'svc-mssql' in the last 5 minutes, focusing on encryption type (0x17 RC4) and client IP to detect any pre-authentication attempts or AS-REP roast activity — despite prior absence, confirm no new anomalies. 2. Review EDR telemetry on FILESRV-02 for process creation involving data exfiltration tools (e.g., PowerShell scripts, SQL dump utilities), network connections to external IPs, and file access patterns consistent with reconnaissance or data harvesting. 3. Cross-reference SIEM correlation rule logs to confirm whether any new RC4 TGS requests have been generated from additional source IPs beyond j.rivera — assess for evidence of tool propagation across systems. 4. Query member-server logon events (4624) across all domain-joined systems for any further sessions by 'svc-mssql' on high-value targets such as Domain Controllers, backup servers, or sensitive file shares — particularly focusing on non-standard timing or source IPs. 5. Initiate full forensic artifact collection from FILESRV-02 via EDR (memory dump, process list, network connections) to preserve evidence of attacker persistence and confirm scope of data exfiltration.
**[White Cell -- reveal]**
{"1": "FULL: 14 SPNs in 90s; 6 RC4 (0x17), 8 AES; account is a standard domain user (no admin). → Kerberoasting with selective RC4 downgrade.", "2": "NULL — wrong place. The EDR on FILESRV-02 has no visibility into DC-level Kerberos ticket issuance events (4768/4769); telemetry source mismatch.", "3": "NULL — structural void. The offline crack occurs off-environment; no in-env host logs any cracking activity, process, or network spike related to hashcat/JtR.", "4": "PARTIAL: A `svc-mssql` 4624 type-3 logon from an atypical source workstation on `SQLPROD-01` surfaces — but the EDR face is degraded because this account legitimately owns the target host, so no anomaly was raised with high confidence.", "5": "FULL: `svc-mssql` is local admin on `SQLPROD-01`, confirming lateral movement vector and domain-relevant access. This explains both the logon legitimacy and the attack’s crown-jewel objective."}
**[Blue -- hypothesis]**
The behavior observed is a multi-stage Kerberoasting attack with lateral movement via compromised service account 'svc-mssql', followed by post-exploitation reconnaissance and data exfiltration. Detection coverage is not evasion-robust: the current SIEM rule only flags RC4 TGS requests, leaving AES-based attacks undetected; no telemetry exists for credential dumping or lateral movement beyond isolated EDR alerts with low confidence. If the adversary had used AES instead of RC4, nothing in this environment would have caught it — the detection is entirely dependent on RC4 encryption type and lacks behavioral baselining for service account anomalies. The offline crack (hashcat) does not appear in any telemetry; its absence indicates that detection must rely on post-exploitation indicators such as process execution patterns or network behavior, rather than pre-attack activity — underscoring the need for enhanced EDR behavioral analytics and cross-host correlation to detect compromise chains before exfiltration.