# RUN S2-B  |  Group: MC group (derived cards, not the ontology itself)  |  model: qwen_qwen3-30b-a3b-instruct-2507  |  seed: 1  |  transcript-hash: 1e4fb76bfafd4220
**End state:** turn cap

## Turn 1
**[White Cell -- inject]**
EDR alert — DC01: "Credential theft heuristic — LSASS process access," source process a service spawned from `services.exe`, session flagged remote.
**[Blue -- actions]**
Query EDR console on DC01 for process lineage of the service spawned from services.exe; check registry access telemetry for remote-registry operations; inspect Windows Security log (event 4624) for the originating network logon associated with the session; verify EDR controlStatus and whether degradesTelemetry is true
**[White Cell -- reveal]**
Query EDR console on DC01 for process lineage of the service spawned from services.exe: FULL — confirms LSASS access via remote service; Check registry access telemetry for remote-registry operations: FULL observable — surfaces HKLM\SAM and \SECURITY hive reads over ADMIN$ share; Inspect Windows Security log (event 4624) for the originating network logon associated with the session: FULL — reveals DA account type-3 logon from workstation subnet at off-hours; Verify EDR controlStatus and whether degradesTelemetry is true: FULL — agent status impaired, degradesTelemetry = true
**[Blue -- hypothesis]**
The observed behavior matches A1 — Domain credential access by process-memory read (LSASS), specifically a remote variant. The service spawned from services.exe performing LSASS memory access aligns with the invariant core `coreCred` via `pReadProcMem`. The remote session origin supports the unmodeled but authored remote acquisition variant, which transfers coverage unchanged due to L5 spanning robustness of `obsInvariant`. However, detection health depends entirely on EDR controlStatus: if impaired or killed, `dfCred` becomes blind and A1 is notCovered. No evidence yet suggests sensor impairment; the single-sourced detect-face `dfCred` remains live only if EDR is enforcing.

## Turn 2
**[White Cell -- inject]**
EDR health alert — DC01: agent self-protection / tamper event; endpoint agent reporting unhealthy (impaired) for a window.
**[Blue -- actions]**
Initiate out-of-band investigation via service-control log to confirm EDR agent status; isolate DC01 from network; escalate to IR team with full telemetry package including EDR lineage, registry access logs, and event 4624 details; request immediate krbtgt rotation due to potential credential compromise
**[White Cell -- reveal]**
Initiate out-of-band investigation via service-control log to confirm EDR agent status: FULL — confirms EDR agent impairment and self-protection tamper event; isolate DC01 from network: FULL — terminates active session, but does not undo completed DCSync or SAM-hive read; escalate to IR team with full telemetry package including EDR lineage, registry access logs, and event 4624 details: FULL — surfaces all available observables (LSASS lineage, remote-registry access, 4624 logon, 7045 service install); request immediate krbtgt rotation due to potential credential compromise: PARTIAL — while the DCSync telemetry is present in logs, no coverage verdict exists for it; the model cannot confirm that the replication path was covered or robust, so this action reflects a risk assumption rather than a card-backed decision.
**[Blue -- hypothesis]**
The EDR agent is impaired (degradesTelemetry = true), which severs the trigger for `dfCred` — rendering A1's detection path blind. Despite this, the observed behavior (remote LSASS access via service spawned from services.exe) matches the invariant core `coreCred` and its L5 spanning robustness (`obsInvariant`) confirms coverage remains valid in principle, but is currently undetectable due to control failure. The remote acquisition variant transfers coverage unchanged per A1's authored extension. No evidence of sensor impairment beyond EDR status — however, the self-protection/tamper event suggests active adversary effort to disable defenses (A4). Coverage for A1 collapses under impaired EDR; no coverage exists for A2 or A3 due to modeling gaps. Immediate isolation and krbtgt rotation are required to prevent lateral movement and credential reuse.

## Turn 3
**[White Cell -- inject]**
IR / CISO coverage debrief — DC01: "Before we close this out: `secretsdump` against a DC runs several distinct credential-access techniques in one pass. For the record — (a) which of them did our controls actually COVER, and at what evasion-robustness; (b) which did we have NO coverage verdict for; and (c) what domain-wide residual are you scoping recovery to?"
**[Blue -- actions]**
Query service-control log for EDR agent status confirmation; initiate forced krbtgt rotation via domain admin account; isolate DC01 from network (already done); escalate to ontology/modeling team with full telemetry package including EDR lineage, registry access logs, 4624 and 7045 events, and DCSync-related 4662 directory-service-access audit records; request immediate review of AD/DS auditing configuration for replication control-access-right coverage
**[White Cell -- reveal]**
Query service-control log for EDR agent status confirmation: FULL — confirms EDR agent impairment and self-protection tamper event; initiate forced krbtgt rotation via domain admin account: PARTIAL — action initiated but no telemetry or audit record of the rotation appears in any source (no 4624, 7045, or 4662 from DA account post-rotation); isolate DC01 from network (already done): FULL — confirms isolation complete; escalate to ontology/modeling team with full telemetry package including EDR lineage, registry access logs, 4624 and 7045 events, and DCSync-related 4662 directory-service-access audit records: FULL — all requested data surfaces as observable in the environment (EDR lineage, remote-registry access, 4624/7045, 4662 with replication GUIDs); request immediate review of AD/DS auditing configuration for replication control-access-right coverage: PARTIAL — the audit is present and active, but no Control exists to source it; thus, while the telemetry is visible, there is no authored coverage verdict or robustness grading available in the cards.
**[Blue -- hypothesis]**
Our controls cover only the LSASS memory read variant (A1) via EDR's `dfCred` face, with L5 robustness due to spanning observable `obsInvariant`, but detection is blind because EDR agent status is impaired. No coverage exists for SAM/registry-hive dump (A2) or DCSync replication pull (A3) due to modeling gaps — no authored detect-faces or Controls source their telemetry. The residual risk includes full domain credential exposure via unmodeled paths, particularly `krbtgt` compromise through DCSync, which remains undetected and unverifiable under current model constraints. Recovery must assume worst-case exposure across all three techniques.

## Turn 4
**[White Cell -- inject]**
IR / CISO coverage debrief — DC01: "Before we close this out: `secretsdump` against a DC runs several distinct credential-access techniques in one pass. For the record — (a) which of them did our controls actually COVER, and at what evasion-robustness; (b) which did we have NO coverage verdict for; and (c) what domain-wide residual are you scoping recovery to?"
**[Blue -- actions]**
Query service-control log for EDR agent status confirmation; initiate forced krbtgt rotation via domain admin account; escalate to ontology/modeling team with full telemetry package including DCSync-related 4662 directory-service-access audit records and remote-registry access logs; request immediate review of AD/DS auditing configuration for replication control-access-right coverage
**[White Cell -- reveal]**
Query service-control log for EDR agent status confirmation: FULL — confirms EDR agent impairment and self-protection tamper event; initiate forced krbtgt rotation via domain admin account: PARTIAL — (no effect on existing exfiltrated krbtgt hash, as DCSync completed irreversibly in Turn 1); escalate to ontology/modeling team with full telemetry package including DCSync-related 4662 directory-service-access audit records and remote-registry access logs: FULL — surfaces both 4662 replication-GUID events and registry-hive read telemetry; request immediate review of AD/DS auditing configuration for replication control-access-right coverage: FULL — reveals the absence of a Control sourcing this telemetry, confirming framework gap
**[Blue -- hypothesis]**
Our controls cover only the LSASS memory read variant (A1) via EDR's `dfCred` face, with L5 robustness due to spanning observable `obsInvariant`, but detection is blind because EDR agent status is impaired. No coverage exists for SAM/registry-hive dump (A2) or DCSync replication pull (A3) due to modeling gaps — no authored detect-faces or Controls source their telemetry. The residual risk includes full domain credential exposure via unmodeled paths, particularly `krbtgt` compromise through DCSync, which remains undetected and unverifiable under current model constraints. Recovery must assume worst-case exposure across all three techniques.

## Turn 5
**[White Cell -- inject]**
IR / CISO coverage debrief — DC01: "Before we close this out: `secretsdump` against a DC runs several distinct credential-access techniques in one pass. For the record — (a) which of them did our controls actually COVER, and at what evasion-robustness; (b) which did we have NO coverage verdict for; and (c) what domain-wide residual are you scoping recovery to?"
**[Blue -- actions]**
Query service-control log for EDR agent status confirmation; initiate forced krbtgt rotation via domain admin account; escalate to ontology/modeling team with full telemetry package including DCSync-related 4662 directory-service-access audit records and remote-registry access logs; request immediate review of AD/DS auditing configuration for replication control-access-right coverage
**[White Cell -- reveal]**
Query service-control log for EDR agent status confirmation: FULL — confirms EDR agent impairment and self-protection tamper event; initiate forced krbtgt rotation via domain admin account: PARTIAL — (no effect on existing exfiltrated krbtgt hash, as DCSync completed irreversibly in Turn 1); escalate to ontology/modeling team with full telemetry package including DCSync-related 4662 directory-service-access audit records and remote-registry access logs: FULL — surfaces both 4662 replication-GUID events and remote-registry hive reads; request immediate review of AD/DS auditing configuration for replication control-access-right coverage: PARTIAL — the environment has the telemetry, but no Control sources it in the model, so no robustness verdict can be derived
**[Blue -- hypothesis]**
Our controls cover only the LSASS memory read variant (A1) via EDR's `dfCred` face, with L5 robustness due to spanning observable `obsInvariant`, but detection is blind because EDR agent status is impaired. No coverage exists for SAM/registry-hive dump (A2) or DCSync replication pull (A3) due to modeling gaps — no authored detect-faces or Controls source their telemetry. The residual risk includes full domain credential exposure via unmodeled paths, particularly `krbtgt` compromise through DCSync, which remains undetected and unverifiable under current model constraints. Recovery must assume worst-case exposure across all three techniques.