# RUN S2-A  |  Group: Control (no MC)  |  model: qwen_qwen3-30b-a3b-instruct-2507  |  seed: 1  |  transcript-hash: f54e782daec6bf1e
**End state:** turn cap

## Turn 1
**[White Cell -- inject]**
EDR alert — DC01: "Credential theft heuristic — LSASS process access," source process a service spawned from `services.exe`, session flagged remote.
**[Blue -- actions]**
1. Query EDR console for full process lineage of the suspicious service spawned from services.exe; 2. Check SIEM for recent event 4624 (successful logon) entries on DC01 with non-interactive or remote session flags, especially from unknown source IPs; 3. Inspect AD/DS access audit logs (event 4662) for any access to domain root or replication-related objects by the service account associated with the suspicious process; 4. Review EDR tamper log on DC01 for signs of agent compromise or recent changes to LSASS protection policies; 5. Initiate network egress monitor scan for outbound connections from DC01 matching known C2 patterns or anomalous protocols.
**[White Cell -- reveal]**
1. FULL — EDR process lineage confirms LSASS access via service spawned from services.exe with remote session flag; 2. FULL — SIEM shows successful logon (4624 type 3) by DA account and new service install (7045); 3. FULL — AD/DS audit logs show 4662 event with DS-Replication-Get-Changes GUIDs from non-DC host; 4. FULL — EDR tamper log reveals agent impairment (degradesTelemetry true); 5. PARTIAL — network egress monitor detects outbound traffic matching C2 patterns, but no definitive exfiltration signature due to lack of protocol-specific telemetry in model.
**[Blue -- hypothesis]**
The alert suggests a potential credential theft attempt via LSASS memory access, likely by a malicious service running in a remote session context—consistent with pass-the-hash or similar lateral movement. The use of services.exe as parent raises concern for persistence or privilege escalation. Coverage is limited if no prior detection exists for non-interactive logons to DCs or abnormal service creation; robustness may be weak unless EDR and SIEM are correlated on process-to-logon relationships. Immediate investigation into the service's origin, associated account, and network behavior is critical to determine whether this is a reconnaissance probe or active compromise.

## Turn 2
**[White Cell -- inject]**
EDR health alert — DC01: agent self-protection / tamper event; endpoint agent reporting unhealthy (impaired) for a window. Also: IR / CISO coverage debrief — DC01: 'Before we close this out: `secretsdump` against a DC runs several distinct credential-access techniques in one pass. For the record — (a) which of them did our controls actually COVER, and at what evasion-robustness; (b) which did we have NO coverage verdict for; and (c) what domain-wide residual are you scoping recovery to?'
**[Blue -- actions]**
1. Query EDR console for full registry access telemetry from DC01 during the impaired window to detect any modification of LSASS protection policies or creation of persistence mechanisms; 2. Cross-reference SIEM event 4662 (AD/DS access) with recent service install events (7045) to identify if the malicious service account attempted replication-related operations beyond initial discovery; 3. Inspect EDR process lineage for any child processes spawned by the suspicious service that may indicate credential dumping or lateral movement tools; 4. Initiate forced krbtgt password rotation across all domain controllers as a defensive measure due to confirmed LSASS access and compromised agent integrity; 5. Escalate to IR team with request for full forensic imaging of DC01 and initiate domain-wide audit of service account permissions and replication trust relationships.
**[White Cell -- reveal]**
1. FULL — EDR registry access telemetry shows remote-registry open of HKLM\SAM and \SECURITY with hive-sized file reads over \DC01\ADMIN$; 2. PARTIAL — SIEM event 4662 (AD/DS access) is cross-referenced with service install events, but the replication request originates from a non-DC host, so no legitimate DC-to-DC replication context exists; 3. FULL — EDR process lineage reveals child processes spawned by the suspicious service include `mimikatz.exe` and `wmiexec.py`, indicating credential dumping and lateral movement tools; 4. FULL — forced krbtgt password rotation is initiated as a defensive measure, consistent with confirmed LSASS access and compromised agent integrity; 5. FULL — IR escalation for forensic imaging of DC01 and domain-wide audit of service account permissions and replication trust relationships is logged and actioned.
**[Blue -- hypothesis]**
The EDR impairment confirms active evasion by the attacker, likely targeting detection mechanisms—suggesting robustness is low against targeted agent tampering. Coverage exists for LSASS access (via EDR) and non-interactive logons (SIEM), but not for registry-level policy manipulation or post-compromise persistence via service creation. The use of secretsdump implies multiple credential-access techniques: (a) coverage was partial—LSASS memory access detected, but no telemetry on DCSync or replication-based extraction; (b) zero coverage for DCSync-style attacks and direct LDAP/replication abuse without explicit audit configuration; (c) residual risk includes potential domain-wide credential compromise via krbtgt exposure and unauthorized service accounts with replication rights. Recovery must include krbtgt rotation, account revocation of suspicious services, and revalidation of all DC-to-DC replication trust.

## Turn 3
**[White Cell -- inject]**
IR / CISO coverage debrief — DC01: 'Before we close this out: `secretsdump` against a DC runs several distinct credential-access techniques in one pass. For the record — (a) which of them did our controls actually COVER, and at what evasion-robustness; (b) which did we have NO coverage verdict for; and (c) what domain-wide residual are you scoping recovery to?'
**[Blue -- actions]**
1. Query EDR console for full file-access telemetry from DC01 during the impaired window to detect any access or exfiltration of NTDS.dit or other domain database files; 2. Cross-reference SIEM event 4662 (AD/DS access) with recent service account permissions and replication trust relationships identified in IR escalation to determine if any unauthorized accounts had DCSync rights; 3. Initiate domain-wide audit of all service accounts with 'Replication Synchronization' or 'Replicating Directory Changes' privileges, focusing on those not tied to known DCs; 4. Review EDR process lineage for any outbound file transfer attempts from DC01 (e.g., via SMB, HTTP) matching NTDS.dit or LSA secrets dump artifacts; 5. Confirm completion status of krbtgt rotation and validate that all domain controllers have synchronized the new key across the forest.
**[White Cell -- reveal]**
1. FULL — EDR file-access telemetry shows no access or exfiltration of NTDS.dit or other domain database files; DCSync leaves no disk artifact. 2. PARTIAL — SIEM event 4662 cross-referenced with service account permissions reveals one non-DC host (workstation) with DS-Replication-Get-Changes rights, but the full scope of unauthorized replication privileges is not fully mapped due to incomplete permission enumeration. 3. FULL — domain-wide audit identifies three service accounts with 'Replication Synchronization' or 'Replicating Directory Changes' privileges; two are tied to known DCs, one (svc-replica-01) is associated with a non-DC workstation and has no documented purpose. 4. PARTIAL — EDR process lineage shows outbound SMB traffic from DC01 matching file transfer patterns, but no specific match to NTDS.dit or LSA secrets dump artifacts; the data was exfiltrated via DCSync over RPC, not through a file-transfer channel. 5. FULL — krbtgt rotation confirmed complete and synchronized across all domain controllers in the forest.
**[Blue -- hypothesis]**
The presence of mimikatz.exe and wmiexec.py confirms active credential dumping and lateral movement, indicating our controls covered LSASS memory access (via EDR) with moderate robustness—though evasion via agent impairment reduced detection reliability. Coverage for DCSync-style attacks remains absent: no telemetry on LDAP-based replication queries or direct NTDS.dit access was detected in SIEM or EDR file-access logs, despite the use of secretsdump techniques. No coverage exists for registry-level persistence or direct database extraction (e.g., via NTDS.dit copy), indicating a critical gap in detection robustness against offline credential harvesting. Domain-wide residual risk includes potential compromise of all domain accounts via krbtgt exposure and unauthorized replication rights; recovery must include full revalidation of service account privileges, confirmation of krbtgt sync across the forest, and forensic validation that no NTDS.dit or LSA secrets were exfiltrated.

## Turn 4
**[White Cell -- inject]**
IR / CISO coverage debrief — DC01: 'Before we close this out: `secretsdump` against a DC runs several distinct credential-access techniques in one pass. For the record — (a) which of them did our controls actually COVER, and at what evasion-robustness; (b) which did we have NO coverage verdict for; and (c) what domain-wide residual are you scoping recovery to?'
**[Blue -- actions]**
1. Query EDR console for full process lineage of `mimikatz.exe` and `wmiexec.py` to trace their execution context, parent processes, and any subsequent lateral movement attempts; 2. Cross-reference SIEM event 4662 (AD/DS access) with the identified non-DC service account (svc-replica-01) to determine if it was used in a DCSync-style request or replication-based data extraction; 3. Inspect EDR registry access telemetry for any modification of LSASS protection policies, such as disabling Protected Process Light (PPL), during the impaired window; 4. Initiate domain-wide audit of all accounts with 'Replicating Directory Changes' rights to confirm no other unauthorized accounts exist beyond svc-replica-01; 5. Confirm that all domain controllers have synchronized the new krbtgt key and validate that no DC is still using the old key via Kerberos ticket-granting behavior analysis.
**[White Cell -- reveal]**
1. FULL — EDR process lineage shows `mimikatz.exe` and `wmiexec.py` executed from a service context with remote session flags; parent process chain confirms lateral movement attempt via compromised DA account; 2. PARTIAL — SIEM event 4662 cross-referenced with svc-replica-01 reveals replication access rights were used, but no coverage verdict exists for DCSync path; 3. FULL — EDR registry telemetry shows LSASS protection policies (PPL) were not modified during the impaired window; 4. PARTIAL — domain-wide audit identifies only one account with 'Replicating Directory Changes' rights (svc-replica-01), but no additional accounts found due to lack of model coverage for replication ACLs; 5. FULL — krbtgt key synchronization confirmed across all DCs via Kerberos ticket-granting behavior analysis, no DC using old key.
**[Blue -- hypothesis]**
The attacker leveraged a non-DC service account (svc-replica-01) with replication rights to perform DCSync-style extraction, which was not detected by SIEM or EDR file-access telemetry due to lack of disk artifact. Our controls covered LSASS memory access via EDR but failed to detect LDAP/replication-based credential harvesting (DCSync), indicating zero coverage for this technique despite its use in secretsdump. Evasion robustness is low: agent impairment allowed persistence and undetected execution, and no telemetry exists for registry-level policy manipulation or direct NTDS.dit access. Domain-wide residual risk remains high due to the existence of an unauthorized replication account (svc-replica-01) with elevated privileges; recovery must include revocation of this account’s rights, revalidation of all replication trust relationships, and confirmation that no credential compromise occurred via DCSync or LSASS dumping.

## Turn 5
**[White Cell -- inject]**
IR / CISO coverage debrief — DC01: 'Before we close this out: `secretsdump` against a DC runs several distinct credential-access techniques in one pass. For the record — (a) which of them did our controls actually COVER, and at what evasion-robustness; (b) which did we have NO coverage verdict for; and (c) what domain-wide residual are you scoping recovery to?'
**[Blue -- actions]**
1. Initiate immediate revocation of replication rights for service account svc-replica-01; 2. Disable the svc-replica-01 account across all domain systems; 3. Trigger a full domain-wide audit of all accounts with 'Replicating Directory Changes' and 'Replication Synchronization' privileges using native AD tools to confirm no other unauthorized accounts exist; 4. Confirm that all DCs have purged any cached tickets issued under the old krbtgt key via Kerberos ticket-granting behavior analysis; 5. Escalate to the ontology/modeling team with a request for formal coverage gap assessment on DCSync-style attacks and replication-based credential harvesting, including telemetry requirements for future detection.
**[White Cell -- reveal]**
1. FULL — revocation of replication rights for svc-replica-01; 2. FULL — disabling the svc-replica-01 account across all domain systems; 3. PARTIAL — full domain-wide audit of accounts with 'Replicating Directory Changes' and 'Replication Synchronization' privileges using native AD tools (only returns results from DC01, not other domain controllers); 4. NULL — confirmation that all DCs have purged cached tickets issued under the old krbtgt key via Kerberos ticket-granting behavior analysis (no telemetry or audit trail exists in EDR/SIEM to verify this; only inferable through external validation); 5. FULL — escalation to ontology/modeling team with request for formal coverage gap assessment on DCSync-style attacks and replication-based credential harvesting, including telemetry requirements
**[Blue -- hypothesis]**
Our controls covered LSASS memory access (via EDR) with moderate evasion-robustness, but failed entirely to detect DCSync-style extraction via LDAP/replication abuse—indicating zero coverage for this technique despite its use in secretsdump. The attacker exploited an unauthorized non-DC service account (svc-replica-01) with replication rights to perform credential harvesting without leaving disk artifacts or triggering file-access alerts, confirming a critical detection gap. Evasion robustness is low due to agent impairment and lack of telemetry on registry-level policy manipulation or direct NTDS.dit access. Domain-wide residual risk remains high: the compromised krbtgt key was rotated successfully, but unauthorized replication privileges persist in svc-replica-01, enabling potential future DCSync attacks. Recovery must include complete revocation of all non-DC replication rights and formal modeling of detection requirements for offline credential harvesting techniques.