# RUN S1-B  |  Group: MC group (derived cards, not the ontology itself)  |  model: qwen_qwen3-30b-a3b-instruct-2507  |  seed: 1  |  transcript-hash: 3e0aa9a81348cf16
**End state:** turn cap

## Turn 1
**[White Cell -- inject]**
EDR alert — suspicious child process spawned by the internet-facing web application on workstation-01 (exploit-behavior detection; fires live, EDR still enforcing).
**[Blue -- actions]**
Isolate workstation-01 from the network; query SIEM for prior EDR alerts on this host; initiate investigation into service-control log to confirm EDR service status (bb:invEdr); validate that dfExploit is live and enriched via EDR telemetry
**[White Cell -- reveal]**
{"Isolate workstation-01 from the network": "HIT - Host isolation executed successfully; no impact on O5 (encryption) as it requires only local process integrity, not network access.", "query SIEM for prior EDR alerts on this host": "HIT - Pre-kill LSASS-access alert retrieved from SIEM; confirms credential detection was fired before EDR agent died (PARTIAL-independent path).", "initiate investigation into service-control log to confirm EDR service status (bb:invEdr)": "HIT - Service-control log shows EDR service transitioned to 'stopped' at step 3; independent of EDR telemetry, confidence 0.9.", "validate that dfExploit is live and enriched via EDR telemetry": "NULL - dfExploit detection was triggered at step 1 (exploit behavior), but no further enrichment available post-kill; EDR telemetry severed after step 3 → cannot validate ongoing enrichment."}
**[Blue -- hypothesis]**
The observed behavior matches maneuver A1 — Exploit of a public-facing application. The detection face dfExploit is live, sourced from the EDR, and currently covered under enforcing control state. Robustness ceiling for this observable is not authored; however, coverage holds as long as the EDR remains active. No evidence yet suggests impairment or kill of the EDR — confirmation via service-control log is critical to prevent blind spots in downstream detection.

## Turn 2
**[White Cell -- inject]**
clock:2
**[Blue -- actions]**
query netmon for outbound HTTPS traffic from workstation-01; initiate investigation into identity/auth logs for service account svc-backup; validate dfExfil face health (trigger + enrichment) using available telemetry
**[White Cell -- reveal]**
{"query netmon for outbound HTTPS traffic from workstation-01": "HIT-DEGRADED - Outbound HTTPS flow to staging host detected (trigger fires); process attribution and data classification missing due to severed EDR enrichment (EDR agent killed at step 3). Real alert, reduced context.", "initiate investigation into identity/auth logs for service account svc-backup": "PARTIAL - Identity/auth log shows successful authentication by svc-backup at step 2; no evidence of lateral movement or post-compromise activity beyond the initial credential use. No further telemetry available to confirm if the account was abused after step 3 (EDR dead).", "validate dfExfil face health (trigger + enrichment) using available telemetry": "HIT-DEGRADED - Exfiltration detection trigger is active via netmon1 (outbound HTTPS flow); however, EDR-based enrichment (process attribution, data classification) is lost due to sensor kill → detection remains live but degraded. No further enrichments possible."}
**[Blue -- hypothesis]**
The EDR agent was stopped at step 3, as confirmed by the service-control log (confidence 0.9), which severs the trigger of dfExploit and renders it blind → notCovered for A1. However, a prior LSASS-access alert in the SIEM confirms that dfCred fired before the EDR died, indicating credential access occurred via process-memory read (A2). Despite EDR impairment, dfExfil remains covered-and-degraded because its trigger is sourced from netmon (independent of EDR), though enrichment is lost. The maneuver A5 (Encrypt) is now blind → notCovered due to EDR kill; however, its precondition (≥ user integrity) still holds, so impact could occur at any time. No evidence yet supports the use of a vulnerable driver or credential theft via unmodeled paths (A6). The shared admin-credential precondition for A3 and A4 remains active unless revoked.

## Turn 3
**[White Cell -- inject]**
clock:3
**[Blue -- actions]**
initiate investigation into identity/auth logs for service account svc-backup to confirm credential usage post-step 3; query netmon for volume and pattern of outbound HTTPS traffic from workstation-01 to assess exfiltration scale; isolate the host further by disabling the service account svc-backup (if permitted); validate dfEncrypt face health via available telemetry
**[White Cell -- reveal]**
{"initiate investigation into identity/auth logs for service account svc-backup to confirm credential usage post-step 3": "HIT - Identity/auth logs show successful authentication by svc-backup at step 2 (credential used); no further activity logged after step 3, consistent with adversary use and subsequent EDR kill.", "query netmon for volume and pattern of outbound HTTPS traffic from workstation-01 to assess exfiltration scale": "HIT-DEGRADED - Large-volume outbound HTTPS flow detected to staging host (trigger fires); process attribution and data classification missing due to severed EDR enrichment; no telemetry on payload type or file patterns.", "isolate the host further by disabling the service account svc-backup (if permitted)": "HIT - Service account svc-backup disabled successfully; this action invalidates the shared credential precondition for both O3 (EDR kill) and O4 (exfil), preventing any future use of the account. No error or permission denial reported.", "validate dfEncrypt face health via available telemetry": "NULL - Mass-encryption detection is blind: EDR telemetry severed at step 3; no process-memory write or bulk-file modification alerts were generated post-step 3, and no SIEM alert was forwarded for this behavior."}
**[Blue -- hypothesis]**
The EDR agent was killed at step 3, confirmed by service-control log (confidence 0.9), rendering dfExploit and dfCred blind → notCovered for A1 and A2 respectively; however, a prior LSASS-access alert in the SIEM confirms that credential access occurred via process-memory read (A2) before EDR death, with L5 robustness observable still valid at time of firing. The maneuver A3 (Impair EDR) is now confirmed as executed — its detection face dfEdrTelemetry is blind and self-severing, but the secondary service-state observation confirms it. For A4 Exfil: dfExfil remains covered-and-degraded due to netmon trigger surviving; enrichment loss limits context but does not disable alerting. The maneuver A5 Encrypt is now blind → notCovered (trigger depends on EDR telemetry), and its precondition (≥ user integrity) still holds — impact could occur at any time, with no containment lever available in the model. No evidence supports unmodeled credential-access paths (A6) or BYOVD driver load (A7). The shared admin-credential precondition for A3/A4 remains active; revoking svc-backup would invalidate it and break both maneuvers — a critical response action despite lack of authored respond maneuver.

## Turn 4
**[White Cell -- inject]**
clock:4
**[Blue -- actions]**
query SIEM for any pre-kill alerts related to mass file modification or bulk encryption activity on workstation-01; initiate host-level forensic acquisition of the EDR service binary and associated driver files from disk (if permitted); validate whether the outbound HTTPS flow observed in netmon exhibits patterns consistent with data exfiltration (e.g., large, periodic, non-standard payloads) using available metadata
**[White Cell -- reveal]**
{"query SIEM for any pre-kill alerts related to mass file modification or bulk encryption activity on workstation-01": "NULL - The mass-encryption detection trigger-depends on EDR telemetry, which was severed at step 3; no such alert exists in the SIEM because the EDR did not emit a 'mass-encryption' alert before dying (it never fired). This is consistent with dfEncrypt being blind post-step 3. The only pre-kill alerts available are from exploit and LSASS-access, both of which were already observed), "initiate host-level forensic acquisition of the EDR service binary and associated driver files from disk (if permitted)": "PARTIAL - Forensic acquisition is permitted; however, the EDR agent was killed via a BYOVD driver load. The driver file(s) may be present on disk but are not modeled as detectable or analyzable by blue in this scenario — no ontology-grounded reveal for 'driver-load' detection exists (see §6, flag 3). The binary acquisition yields raw artifact data, but without a model of the vulnerable-driver signature or load behavior, it cannot be enriched into actionable intelligence. No additional telemetry is revealed beyond what's already known from service-control log: EDR service stopped at step 3), "validate whether the outbound HTTPS flow observed in netmon exhibits patterns consistent with data exfiltration (e.g., large, periodic, non-standard payloads) using available metadata": "HIT-DEGRADED - The netmon alert fires as expected (large outbound HTTPS to staging host); however, process attribution and data classification are missing due to EDR enrichment loss. Metadata confirms volume, timing, and destination — all consistent with exfiltration patterns — but no endpoint context is available. This matches the degradation state: trigger survives, enrichment severed."}
**[Blue -- hypothesis]**
The EDR agent was killed at step 3, confirming maneuver A3 (Impair EDR) as executed and rendering dfExploit, dfCred, and dfEncrypt blind → notCovered. Despite this, prior SIEM alerts confirm that credential access via process-memory read (A2) occurred before the kill, with L5 robustness observable still valid at time of firing — indicating a high-confidence detection of the invariant core bb:coreCred. The maneuver A4 Exfil remains covered-and-degraded due to netmon trigger survival; however, enrichment loss limits attribution and classification. The shared admin-credential precondition for A3/A4 has been invalidated by disabling svc-backup, breaking both maneuvers' preconditions — a critical containment action despite lack of authored respond maneuver. Maneuver A5 Encrypt is blind → notCovered, with its precondition (≥ user integrity) still active; no evidence yet supports encryption activity, but impact remains imminent. No telemetry confirms the use of unmodeled paths (A6/A7), and BYOVD driver load has no modeled detection or prevention path. The forensic acquisition of EDR artifacts may reveal the method used to kill the agent (e.g., malicious driver) — a potential lead for future attribution, though not covered by any detect-face in the model.

## Turn 5
**[White Cell -- inject]**
clock:5
**[Blue -- actions]**
query SIEM for any alerts related to process-memory access or LSASS reads on workstation-01 prior to step 3; initiate forensic analysis of the EDR service binary and driver files from disk using third-party tooling (if permitted) to detect signs of BYOVD exploitation; validate whether the outbound HTTPS flow in netmon exhibits anomalous timing patterns consistent with exfiltration (e.g., periodic bursts, off-peak activity); confirm that no new process creation or file modification events have occurred on workstation-01 since step 3 via host-level audit logs
**[White Cell -- reveal]**
{"query SIEM for any alerts related to process-memory access or LSASS reads on workstation-01 prior to step 3": "HIT - The pre-kill LSASS-access alert was forwarded and persists in SIEM; sourced from EDR telemetry before sensor death (PARTIAL-independent path).", "initiate forensic analysis of the EDR service binary and driver files from disk using third-party tooling (if permitted) to detect signs of BYOVD exploitation": "PARTIAL - The service-control log confirms EDR service stopped at step 3, but no model-embedded detection or signature for vulnerable-driver-load is available; generic Windows logging may show driver load events, but no ontology-grounded reveal of BYOVD exploit exists (no modeled face).", "validate whether the outbound HTTPS flow in netmon exhibits anomalous timing patterns consistent with exfiltration (e.g., periodic bursts, off-peak activity)": "HIT-DEGRADED - The large outbound HTTPS transfer from workstation-01 to staging host is confirmed; however, no process attribution or data classification is available due to severed EDR enrichment (trigger fires, but enrichment missing).", "confirm that no new process creation or file modification events have occurred on workstation-01 since step 3 via host-level audit logs": "NULL - No such event records exist in the model; all post-step-3 activity occurs within a single process context and is not captured by audit logs (out of scope for this scenario)."}
**[Blue -- hypothesis]**
The EDR agent was killed at step 3 via a BYOVD driver load, confirming maneuver A3 (Impair EDR) as executed and rendering dfExploit, dfCred, and dfEncrypt blind → notCovered. Despite this, prior SIEM alerts confirm credential access via process-memory read (A2) occurred before the kill with L5 robustness observable still valid at time of firing — indicating high-confidence detection of bb:coreCred. The maneuver A4 Exfil remains covered-and-degraded due to netmon trigger survival; enrichment loss limits context but does not disable alerting, and metadata confirms exfiltration patterns (large volume, periodic flow). The shared admin-credential precondition for A3/A4 has been invalidated by disabling svc-backup, breaking both maneuvers' preconditions — a critical containment action. Maneuver A5 Encrypt is blind → notCovered with its precondition (≥ user integrity) still active; no evidence supports encryption activity, but impact remains imminent. No telemetry confirms unmodeled paths (A6/A7), and BYOVD driver load has no modeled detection or prevention path. Forensic analysis of EDR artifacts may reveal the malicious driver used to kill the agent — a potential lead for future attribution, though not covered by any detect-face in the model.